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CASE NOTE
CRIMINAL LAW-Violation of Statute Requiring Obedi-
ence to Traffic Officers.-Defendant was charged with vio-
lation of the local "obedience" ordinance and the state "obedi-
ence" statute which provided: "No person shall willfully fail
or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of
any police officer invested by law with authority to direct,
control, or regulate traffic." Defendant had approached an
intersection at which a police officer was directing traffic
from the center of the intersection. After defendant signaled
for a left turn, he was ordered by the police officer to proceed
straight ahead. Defendant refused to comply with the direc-
tion of the police officer and was thereupon arrested. The
police officer testified that the violation* took place about
5 p.m. and that he was allowing no left turns due to the
condition of the traffic at that time. There was no city ordi-
nance or state law prohibiting left turns at the intersection
in question. The trial court found the defendant guilty. On
appeal, HELD: Reversed and defendant discharged. In the
absence of a showing that state or local legislation made it
unlawful for defendant to make a left turn at the intersection
in question, or that the police officer directing him not to do
so had been vested with authority to so direct him, conviction
for violation of the "obedience" statute could not stand.
Though a police officer may be invested by proper legislation,
state or local, with authority to direct, control or regulate
traffic in accordance with reasonable standards set forth
therein, in the absence of such legislation he has only the
power to execute and enforce those traffic regulations duly
enacted and promulgated by proper legislative enactment.
State v. Pascatle, -- R. I. _, 134 A. 2d 149 (1957).
The "obedience" statute under which this action was
brought follows the language of the Uniform Act Regulating
Traffic on the Highways, Article II, Section 3. 11 UNIFORM
LAWS ANNOTATED 12 (1938). This section has been incorpo-
rated in the statutes of South Carolina, CODE OF LAWS OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 46-287, and in the ordinances of at
least two cities in this state. THE CODE OF THE CITY OF CO-
LUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, 1956 § 20-11; THE CODE OF THE
CITY OF GREENVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA, 1953 § 22-10. Similar
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language, though omitting the words "invested by law... ,"
is used in the ordinances of two other cities in this state.
THE CODE OF THE CITY OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA,
1952 § 46-4; THE CODE OF THE CITY OF SPARTANBURG, SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1950 Chapter 21 § 7. It is well settled that the
right of a citizen to use the public street is not absolute and
unconditional but may be controlled and regulated in the
interest of the public good. Escobedo v. State Department of
Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P. 2d 1 (1950) ; State ex
rel. Nicholas v. Headley, 48 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1950). The right
to regulate motor vehicle traffic on the streets and highways
of the cities and towns comes under the police power of the
state. Kaspack Corporation v. Town of Graham, 99 F. Supp.
124 (M. D. N. C. 1951) ; Phillips v. Officials of City of Val-
paraiso, 233 Ind. 414, 120 N. E. 2d 398 (1954). The power
to regulate and control traffic may be delegated to a munici-
pality by the legislature, Houck v. Minton, 187 Tenn. 38, 212
S. W. 2d 891 (1948), but the municipality can exercise only
such control as has been delegated to it by the state. Hacken-
sack Water Co. v. Ruta, 3 N. J. 139, 69 A. 2d 321 (1949) ;
In re Seltenreich, 95 Okla. Crim. 250, 244 P. 2d 587 (1952). A
legislative body may not delegate legislative functions to offi-
cers, boards or commissions, though it may empower them
to carry out in detail its purposes and promulgate rules by
which to put in force legislative regulations. Cavanaugh v.
Gerk, 313 Mo. 375, 280 S. W. 51 (1926); Jones v. State, 95
Okla. Crim. 323, 245 P. 2d 756 (1952). A legislative body can-
not constitutionally delegate to an administrative officer an
exercise of discretionary powers which are arbitrary. North-
ern Boiler Co. v. David, 157 Ohio St. 564, 105 N. E. 2d 451
(1952) ; Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S. E. 579, 71
A. L. R. 604 (1930). Certain discretion may be vested in the
police in the regulation of traffic on the street, especially in
the congested parts of the city since this is administrative
rather than legislative power. Houck v. Minton, supra; Taylor
v. Roberts, 84 Fla. 654, 94 So. 874 (1922) ; 2 McQuILLIN, MU-
NICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.41 (3rd ed. 1949). A public offi-
cer has such powers as are conferred upon him by statute;
and unless a grant of power and authority can be found in the
statute, it must be concluded that there is none. State ex rel.
Young v. Niblock, 229 Ind. 596, 99 N. E. 2d 839 (1951);
Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312, 24 N. W.
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2d 244 (1946). Where discretion has been delegated without
specific rules and regulations to be observed, the provisions
have been declared invalid upon the ground that they vest in
the officer an unnecessary discretion and power of discrimi-
nation. City of St. Louis v. Allen, 275 Mo. 501, 204 S. W. 1083
(1918) ; Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S. E. 579, 71
A. L. R. 604 (1930). But provisions vesting such power
under specified conditions where its exercise may be neces-
sary in order to secure an orderly movement of traffic
have been upheld on the ground that the subject is one which
does not admit to fixed and rigid regulations that will operate
automatically without the intervention of directing intelli-
gence. City of Chicago v. Marriotto, 332 Ill. 44, 163 N. E. 369,
60 A. L. R. 501 (1928); 5 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 18.15 (3rd ed. 1949).
By proper legislative enactment police officers may be
vested with the power to direct traffic under circumstances
which do not admit to fixed and automatic regulations. In
the absence of such an enactment specifically vesting the
police officers with the power to direct traffic, this decision
would seem to raise some doubt as to their power to do so.
But in reading the statutes on regulation of motor vehicles
and traffic as a whole, rather than by isolated sections, there
is a strong indication that it was intended that police officers
should have such powers. Police officers are generally de-
fined by the statutes as one "authorized to direct and regu-
late traffic .... " The statutes have several references to
police officers directing traffic. The regulation and control
of traffic necessarily contemplates a certain power and dis-
cretion being vested in police officers. Statutes in this field
should be construed with respect to the growing complexity
of traffic problems. The regulations are intended to promote
public safety and convenience and should be construed to
accomplish their fair and legitimate purpose. They ought not
to be given an interpretation which would make them an un-
natural and unjustifiable burden on travel or would render
them absurd and unreasonable. Thus in consideration of the
tenor of the statutes as a whole, it is doubtful that the courts
of other jurisdictions would follow this decision in the in-
terpretation of their own statutes.
D. LAURENCE MCINTOSH.
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